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Supreme Court Review
Attorney-General for Ontario v. Barfried Enterprises Ltd., [1963]
S.C.R. 572.
Introduction
The Supreme Court of Canada has recently considered the
validity of the Ontario Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act1 and
declared it to be legislation essentially in relation to annulment or
reformation of a contract. A.-G. for Ontario v. Barfried Enterprises,
Ltd., as the case was originally cited, began as an application under
the Ontario Act for relief against the terms of a mortgage for a face
amount of $2,250.00 with interest at seven per cent. per annum. The
sum actually advanced was $1,432.50, the difference between that
amount and the $2,250.00 being made up of a cornnission of $67.50
and a bonus for $750. The constitutional issue arose for the first
time in our Ontario Court of Appeal,2 when the mortgagee contended
that the Act was unconstitutional because it contravened head 19 of
Section 91 of the British North America Act, which assigned legis-
lative authority in the field of "interest" to Parliament. Essentially,
the decision of Schroeder J.A. was based on a broad interpretation of
"interest" in that section. He defined it as including any compensa-
tion for the loan. Further, he found that the fundamental object of
the Act was "to provide a remedy to a borrower to enable him to
have the terms of.. . a contract modified."'3
Since such a remedy would inevitably reduce "interest" as here
defined, the Court of Appeal concluded that the legislation was in
pith and substance related to interest and that it was in direct con-
flict with Section 2 of the federal Interest Act.
Decision
The Supreme Court of Canada attacks this decision on its two
major grounds. Judson J., speaking for a majority of the Court,
rejects the broader definition of "interest" and considers the legisla-
tion, legislation properly in relation to annulment or reformation of
a contract.
(i) Interest within Section 91(19)
The majority decision proceeds on the finding that all of the
items which the Ontario Act mentions as forming the cost of the
loan,4 except discount and interest itself, are not "interest" within
Section 91. The Court seeks to substantiate this by pointing to day
to day accrual as a touchstone of "interest" as it appears in the
1 R.S.O. 1960, c. 410.
2 [1962] O.R. 1103.
3 Supra, footnote 2, p. 1117.
4 Section 1(a) of the Act includes interest, discount, bonus, commission,
brokerage fees, premium and dues.
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section. Reference is made to a statement of Halsbury5 which, on
closer analysis, appears to support no such proposition.
In order to exclude bonuses from the subject matter of "interest"
the Court relies on its earlier decision in London Loan and Savings
Co. v. Meagher6 and in Asconi Building Corp. v. Vocisano.7 Judson
J., considers that the former case decided that for the purpose of
Section 6 of the Interest Act a bonus is not interest. The ratio of
Smith J.'s decision in the Meagher case is that before the operative
portion of Section 6 applies, the mortgage document must, on its
face, come within one of the plans of payment there set out. On the
actual facts of the Meagher decision, the mortgage document con-
tained no reference to the bonus which had been fixed by prior
agreement as part of the consideration for the loan. It is an acceptable
reading of the case that it stands for the proposition that, for Section
6 to apply, the item which in fact makes up a portion of what is
termed "principal" should be mentioned as compensation of one type
or another (but not necessarily as interest) in the mortgage document
itself. There would then be a blended payment on the face of the
mortgage.
The Asconi case, according to the Supreme Court, recognized
that since the Meagher decision, it must be inferred that the Ontario
case of Singer v. Goldhar s relied upon by Schroeder J.A. for the
wider interpretation of "interest", must be considered as overruled.
Oddly enough, both Kerwin C.J.9 and Rand J.10 expressly said that
the Meagher decision treated bonus as interest for the purpose of
Section 6. The decision in the Asconi case itself in fact appears only
to recognize that for Section 6 to apply, the portion of the alleged
blended payments that is not principal must be mentioned in the
mortgage document as compensation of some sort."1
Even if one concedes that these cases establish that a bonus is
not interest for the purpose of Section 6, it does not follow that a
bonus is not "interest" with head 19 of Section 91 of the British
North America Act. The Interest Act is only a particular use made
5 The statement in Vol. 27 of the 3rd edn. at p. 7 is that "interest accruesde die in diem even if payable only at intervals . ." This, and the case of
Re Rodgers' Trust (1860) 1 Drew & Sm. 338, which is given as authority, it Is
submitted only establish that if what is termed "interest" is payable at Inter-
vals only, it is nevertheless an accumulation of each day's interest and accrues
de die in diem.6 [1930] S.C.R. 378.
7 [1947] S.C.R. 358.
8 (1924) 55 O.L.R. 267.
9 Supra, footnote 7, p. 366.
10 Ibid., p. 369. See also, Kellock J. at p. 372.
11 The Court reasoned that since the payment of bonus and interest was
fixed by prior agreement only, these became debts under the mortgage agree-
ment and part of the principal said to be advanced, so that neither was, as
consideration for the loan, secured by the mortgage document. This does not
recognize that a bonus is not interest for the purpose of Section 6 but only that
a bonus exacted in an agreement collateral to the mortgage document is not
secured as such but as principal, by the mortgage itself.
[VOL.. 3
Supreme Court Review
by Parliament of a wider authority.12 It is submitted that the subject
matter of "interest" includes any compensation for the use of money.
The term, as Schroeder J.A.13 pointed out, is "precise and unambiguous
and . . . should be expounded in its natural and ordinary sense".
The broader definition of "interest" has, in fact, been recognized,
both in the federal Money Lenders Act of 190614 and by our present
Small Loans Act.1 5
This premise of the majority's argument in the Barfried decision
involves a confusion between interest under the Interest Act and
"interest" as descriptive of a federal legislative subject matter under
the British North America Act. Moreover, accepting this narrow
interpretation of head 19 of Section 91, there would seem to be
nothing16 to prevent the province from legislating on the cost of a
bonus (excluding "interest" itself) as such without regard to the
element of unconscionability.
Scope of Section 91(19)
Both Judson J. and Cartwright J. conclude that the Unconscion-
able Transactions Relief Act is valid provincial legislation in relation
to civil rights17 since it deals with reformation of a contract. In the
words of Judson J.: "It is not the rate or amount of interest which
is the concern of the legislation, but whether the transaction as a
whole is one which it would be proper to maintain as having been
freely consented to by the debtor." If a bonus is not "interest", this
conclusion is somewhat easier to accept. But, apparently, from the
language of Judson J., even without this narrower interpretation
of head 19 of Section 91, the substance of the Act would have been
viewed in the same way. If this legislation is concerned simply with
the circumstances surrounding a transaction which might render an
amount of interest agreed upon, excessive, it must still be in relation
to "interest". Head 19 of Section 91 must include these circumstancesjust as it includes the stipulation as to amount of interest itself. This
legislation, then, to be valid, must be in relation to something other
than the conditions which may combine to render an amount of
interest excessive. It is submitted that the soundness of the Supreme
Court's decision is based upon three propositions:
(1) it depends upon the recognition that the element of uncon-
scionability and the circumstances which are relevant to prove its
existence are things apart from the element of excessive cost and
the circumstances through which it may be proved;
(2) it must be that the authority to legislate in relation to this
element of unconscionability, as so defined, is left with the provinces;
and
12 Supra, footnote 6, p. 383.
13 Supra, footnote 2, p. 1106.
14 Statutes of Can. 1906, c. 32.
15 R.S.C. 1952 c. 251.16 The possibility of conflicts of legislation is not here considered.17 See Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons (1881) 7 A.C. 96.
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(3) for this decision to have any practical validity, there must
be a willingness by the courts to search for the element of uncon-
scionability when applying the Act, in circumstances which are
relevant.
The first of these propositions it will be convenient to discuss
with the third.
Generally it is true that the courts have required, before grant-
ing relief under the Ontario Act, both that the cost be excessive
and that the transaction be harsh and unconscionable. Beyond this,
however, there is considerable doubt, especially surrounding the
question as to whether a finding in the circumstances that the cost
is excessive, will in itself satisfy the requirement of unconscion-
ability.'8 This unsettled state results from a failure to distinguish
between circumstances which give rise to excessiveness of cost and
those which have a bearing only on the element of unconscionability.
In the English decision of Carrington's Ltd. v. Smith,19 which dealt
with the English Moneylenders Act of 1900,20 it is said that in deter-
mining whether interest is excessive, one must consider whether the
borrower thoroughly understood the transaction. This factor, it is
submitted, should only be relevant to a consideration of unconscion-
ability. The fact that a borrower in one transaction does not under-
stand a particular term, whereas a borrower in another does, should
not in itself be grounds for labelling the consideration exacted in the
first transaction excessive.
On the other hand, there are decisions 21 which proceed on the
basis, for example; that an absence of risk in the mind of the lender
may alone be sufficient reason for declaring an agreement to be harsh
and unconscionable. The absence of any risk of non-payment and
other factors such as the nature of any security given, although they
may help to determine excessiveness of cost, should not also be used
to label the charging of a usurious interest unconscionable. There
are additional circumstances which give rise to the element of uncon-
scionability.22 This particular type of confusion, in fact, has more
disastrous consequences than the kind found in Carrington's Ltd. v.
Smitk. Once the factors which should determine only excessiveness
1s Compare-Poncione v. Higgins 21 T.L.R. 11, 12 and Carrington's Ltd,
v. Smith [1906] 1 K.B. 79, 88.
19 [1906] 1 K.B. 79 and see Blair v. Buckworth [1908] 24 T.L.R. 474, 476,
20 63 & 64 Vict., c. 51.
2See Saunders v. Newbold [1905] 1 Ch. 260.
22 For the nature of circumstances which may help in determining the
issue of unconscionability, see Part v. Bond, 93 L.T. 49. Generally, a trans-
action will be harsh and unconscionable if there is something in the nature
of undue influence or unfair advantage exerted or taken by the lender, and
which destroys the apparent consent of the borrower; that is, something in
the relationship between the two which renders the position of the borrower
vis & vis the lender, subordinate in some way.
See also: McCabe v. Jeffrey (1917) 40 O.L.R. 476; Stephen Investment
Ltd. v. Le Blanc (1963) 37 D.L.R. (2nd) 346; Levene v. Greenwood 20 T.L.R.
389; Halsey v. Wolfe [1915] 2 Ch. 330; Blair v. Buckwortk (1908) 24 T.L.R.
474; Lewis v. Mills (1914) 30 T.L.R. 438.
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of cost are used to determne unconscionability as well, the latter, as
a necessary requisite, is in danger of disappearing altogether.
If this should happen, so much of the Supreme Court's decision
as is supported by the proposition that the Ontario statute, even
without the narrow definition of "interest", is legislation in relation
to civil rights and not in relation to "interest" would be destroyed
for all practical purposes. As noted above, regulation of the circum-
stances of a transaction which may render interest excessive would
appear to be within the competence of the federal legislative authority
under head 19 of Section 91. Only the determination of unsconscion-
able conduct on the part of a lender, in charging an excessive amount
of compensation, can possibly be regarded as an object of provincial
legislation under property and civil rights. This is one reason that
the distinction between these two elements of excessive cost and
unconscionability must remain. Another is that a failure to recognize
the latter as a distinct element may give rise to more far-reaching
economic results. Liberal use, or even threatened use, of the Ontario
Act, without sufficient attention being given to a finding of uncon-
scionability, might well, for example, involve an interference with
the central government's control of credit rates by its operations in
the money market. Without the recognition of this element as a
distinct requisite of the Act, the practical effect will be that the
authority of the Provincial Legislature would seem to be extended
to the point where it could do indirectly what it could not do directly
by a general fixing of maximum interest rates. Any connection that
may exist between the elements of excessive cost and unconscion-
ability, would be more properly stated by the proposition that an
excessive cost in particular cases may be evidence of harsh and
unconscionable dealing. Martland J., in his dissenting judgment in
the Supreme Court, may have had this in mind when he suggests
that there may be cases in which "the transaction is harsh and
unconscionable because of the excessive cost of the loan". This lack
of complete identity between the circumstances necessary to estab-
lish both the elements may be important, especially where the cost
is excessive but not so excessive as to constitute irrebuttable evidence
of unconscionability. Even this would not be a sufficient safeguard
however, as there is a possibility that the courts, while purporting
to treat excessive cost as only some evidence of unconscionability,
will treat it as conclusive proof of the presence of unconscionable
dealing.
The solution must therefore be that factors other than those
which point to excessive cost must be found before the Act applies.
Only if the Ontario Act is so applied as to preserve the factor of
unconscionability will the Supreme Court's decision that the element
of unfair dealing is at the heart of the Act be justified.
It has already been suggested that a finding that the substance
of the Act is essentially of a provincial nature cannot be supported
s
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by an unrealistic separation of the circumstances rendering an amount
of interest excessive from the field of "interest".
However, the authority to legislate on the factors which render
a transaction unconscionable belongs to the provinces, and is not
removed from the field of property and civil rights by inclusion within
the subject-matter of "interest". It has been suggested23 that Parlia-
ment might exercise its exclusive legislative authority over the field
of "interest" to pass legislation containing provisions to prevent
harsh transactions. In other words, Parliament could, in an Act
dealing generally with the subject of interest, attempt to prevent
transactions which are harsh because of the amount of interest
agreed upon. This does not mean, however, that the federal body
could legislate on transactions which they might deem harsh for
reasons other than excessiveness of compensation. Such legislation
is within the competence of the provinces, and it is in this area of
reformation of contract that the substance of the Ontario Act will
appear to fall, so long as the proper circumstancees are considered in
determining the presence of unconscionability.
There is one question left of practical importance. Accepting the
fact that the Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act is valid provin-
cial legislation, and that "interest" under head 19 of Section 91
excludes bonuses, does it conflict, or may it conflict in a particular
case, with either the Interest Act24 or the Small Loans Act?25
Cartwright J. suggests that "particular cases may arise in which
the provisions of the Provincial Act will come into conflict with those
of the Dominion (Interest) Act". He foresees a case in which the
applicant under the Ontario Act seeks relief from a rate of interest
on the amount actually advanced. This would be an accurate predic-
tion if Section 2 of the Interest Act is interpreted as meaning that
in no case (unless provided for by that Act or another Act of Parlia-
ment) shall a person be prevented from recovering a rate of interest
fixed by the parties. It may be that the result of an application of the
Ontario Act would be to vary the interest rate only because the
transaction was unconscionable (as defined above). However, different
purposes of the two enactments for varying interest would not be
enough to prevent a conflict in fact.26 If, though, Section 2 of the
Dominion Act concerned only the setting aside of a rate of interest
as such without regard to the circumstances surrounding the agree-
ment, there would appear to be no conflict. Such a result might be
reached by interpreting the words "agreed upon" in Section 2 to
mean that Parliament has found it desirable to provide that only
so long as all the requisites for a valid contract as determined by
provincial law are present, may a stipulated rate of interest be
23 See Lethbridge Irrigation Dist. v. Indep. Order of Foresters [1940]
A.C. 513, 530.24 R.S.C. 1952, C. 156.
2 5R.S.C. 1952, c. 251.26 See Att.-Gen. for Can. v. Att-Gen. for British Columbia [1930] A.C.
111, 118, and Royal Trust Co. 'v. Att.-Gen. for Alberta [1937] 1 W.W.R. 376, 386.
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recovered.27 Under this interpretation the section would only deal
with rates of interest generally and expressly would not cover the
field which legislation varying a rate of interest for reasons other
than those concerning the rate itself would occupy.
With respect to the possibility of a conflict with the Small Loans
Act, no such argument as above is available and in every case where
its provisions clash with those of the Ontario Act, the latter will be
inoperative to that extent. However, this does not mean that in
every transaction where the federal Act applies, the Unconscionable
Transactions Relief Act will have no operation. The relevant doctrine
of paramountcy of Dominion legislation applies whether the federal
legislation with which provincial legislation conflicts, relates, as in
this case, to the enumerated classes of Section 91, or is only ancillary
to legislation on such subjects.28 There must, however, be some actual
repugnancy or collision between provisions of the two Acts before
this result will follow. 29 This is not the case of a field which would
otherwise be provincial, having been entirely subsumed under an
exclusive federal heading of Section 91. At the beginning, both legis-
lative bodies are on an equal footing so far as the validity of the two
pieces of legislation is concerned. It is the fact of existing valid
federal legislation which renders provincial legislation either inoper-
ative or ultra vires.30
Whether this results or not should depend on the actual practical
effect of the federal enactment. It is therefore submitted that before
the doctrine of the "occupied field" is employed to render the pro-
vincial enactment inoperative in a given case, there must be a clash
between the two pieces of legislation in an area common to both.
The fact that Parliament has occupied a field is only the reason given
for declaring provincial legislation inoperative once it is decided that
the two enactments collide. This result should not follow simply
because Pariament has occupied the field. There may be a conflict in
the very terms of the two Acts or it may only be that the provincial
Act interferes in some way with the operations of the federal Act,
as was the case in The Reference re The Debt Adjustment Act.31 It is
submitted, however, that there must be a conflict directly or indirectly
before the doctrine of paramountcy applies.
27 This is only one possible interpretation. It is arguable, however, that
sections such as the present Section 2, were enacted for the purpose of declar-ing the Government's policy as regards the old laws on usury. See Lethbridge
Irrigation District v. Independent Order of Foresters [19401 A.C. 513, 531.That such a purpose existed might, however, be difficult to prove, except from
the words of the Act themselves. See: Att.-Gen. of Canada v. The Readers'
Digest Assoc. Ltd. [19611 S.C.R. 775.28 A. H. F. Lefroy: Canada's Federal System p. 123.
29 See Laskin: Canadian Constitutional Law p. 52, 53.
30 Whether provincial legislation is rendered inoperative or ultra vires
depends on whether it is enacted before or after the federal legislation. See
Re Regina v. Dickie [1955] 2 D.L.R. 757, 776.31 [19431 1 W.W.R. 378.
1964]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Conclusion:
These are the major questions raised by the present case. The
attempt here has been to define more exactly the scope of the decision
and to examine the implications of the constitutional issues considered
and the manner in which the Court solves them. The substance of the
Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, as seen by the Supreme
Court, is legislation in relation to reformation of a contract. In order
to satisfy this characterization of the legislation, it is necessary for
the Courts to insist that an applicant under the Act establish uncon-
scionable conduct apart from excessive cost. Only if the Act is so
applied will the far-reaching and unintentional implications be avoided
and the decision kept within its intended limits.
R.J.A.
Robertson and Rosetanni v. The Queen, [19631 S.C.R. 651.
Lieberman v. The Queen, [1963] S.C.R. 643.
The case of Robertson and Rosetanni v. The Queen' concerns the
judicial interpretation of the Lord's Day Act2 and the possibility that
section 4 of that Act is inoperative in the light of the intended effect
of section 2 of the Canadian Bill of Rights.3
It was decided by the Supreme Court of Canada, Cartwright J.
dissenting, that section 4 of the Lord's Day Act was in no way a trans-
gression of the right preserved by section 2 of the Canadian Bill of
Rights, and that no limitation is imposed on a man's right to enjoy
freedom of religion simply because the Lord's Day Act requires him
to refrain from operating a commercial enterprise on Sunday.
The reasons of the learned judges in the majority were delivered
by Ritchie J. The argument is as follows:
Human rights and fundamental freedoms must be construed as
the rights and freedoms existing in Canada immediately before the
Canadian Bill of Rights was passed in 1960, for it is these rights
that are safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and no others.4 Upon this
rather unwarranted assumption the Court then proceeds to determine
the meaning of religious freedom by adopting the observations of
Taschereau J., as he then was, in Chaput v. Romain5 and Rand J. in
Saumur v. City of Quebec and A.G. QWe., 6 concluding that religious
freedom means the right to think and act freely according to the
dictates of one's conscience so long as this thinking and acting does
not transgress a
civilized system of law which imposed limitations on the absolute liberty
of the individual.7
1 [19631 S.C.R. 651.
2 R.S.C. 1952, c. 171.
3 R.S.C. 1960, c. 44.
4 Supra footnote 1 at p. 491.
5 (1955) 1 D.L.R. (2d) 241 at p. 246, [1955] S.C.R. 299.
6 [1953] 4 D.L.R. 641 at p. 668.
7 Supra, footnote 1, p. 492.
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